What are natural kinds?
Though the question is ontological, I will approach it through another, partially linguistic, question. What must natural kinds be like, if the conventional wisdom about natural kind terms is correct? Although answering this question won't tell us everything we want to know, it will, I think, be useful in narrowing the range of feasible ontological alternatives. I will therefore summarize what I take to be the contemporary linguistic wisdom, and then test different proposals about kinds against it. As we will see, some fare better than others.
Following Kripke, I take natural kind terms to be akin to proper names.
1 Like names, they are not synonymous with descriptions associated with them by speakers. They are also like names in the way they are introduced, and have their reference fixed. Just as ordinary names are often introduced by stipulating that they are to refer to certain individuals with which one is already acquainted, so general terms are often introduced with the intention that they are to designate natural kinds with which one is acquainted through their instances. For example, we may imagine the terms 'green', 'gold', 'water', and 'tiger' being introduced by the following stipulations:
The term 'green' is to designate the color of (nearly) all members of a certain class of paradigmatic samples -i.e. it is to designate the characteristic of object surfaces causally responsible for the fact that those samples appear similar to us (and different from paradigmatic non-green samples). Hence, the predicate 'is green' will apply (at a world-state) to precisely those objects the surfaces of which have the characteristic which, at the actual world-state, causally explains why the green-samples look similar to us.
The term 'water' is to designate the unique substance of which (nearly) all members of the class of its paradigmatic samples are instances. Substances are explanatory kinds instances of which share the same basic physical constitution, which in turn explains their most salient characteristics -in the case of watersamples, the fact that they boil and freeze at certain temperatures, that they are clear, potable, and necessary to life, etc. Hence, the predicate 'is water' will apply (at a world-state) to precisely those quantities that have the physical constitution which, at the actual world-state, explains the salient features of (nearly) all paradigmatic water-samples.
The term 'tiger' is to designate the species of animal of which (nearly) all members of the class of its paradigmatic samples are instances. Hence, the predicate 'is a tiger' will apply (at a world-state) to precisely those individuals that are members of the species of which (nearly) all paradigmatic tiger-samples are actually members.
These stipulations are, of course, idealized. The terms could have been introduced by them, and behave pretty much as if they had been. However formal stipulations are not required. It is enough if speakers start calling relevant things 'green', 'water', and 'tigers', with the intention that they are to apply not only to specimens speakers happen to encounter, but to all instances of the kinds to which those specimens belong. Once introduced, natural kind terms are passed from speaker to speaker, just as proper names are.
In addition to being non-descriptive, simple general terms introduced in this way are both rigid and Millian. Since they are rigid, the natural kinds they designate don't change from world-state to world-state. Since they are Millian, there is nothing more to their semantic content, or meaning, than those kinds. The semantic properties of predicates formed using these terms are different from, but determined by, the semantic properties of the terms themselves. For example, whereas the term 'green' rigidly designates the color green --which is both its extension and semantic content --the predicate 'is green' designates the set of individuals to which the color applies, which is its extension. Since the set of green things varies from world-state to world-state, the predicate 'is green' is non-rigid. Similar remarks apply to other natural kind terms and the predicates that contain them. The semantic content of such a predicate consists of the content of its general term plus the content of the copula -roughly, being an instance of.
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For each world-state w, the latter assigns to the argument provided by the content of the general term at w the class of instances of that argument. Since 'green' is Millian (directly referential), its content is the color itself, which is the argument it provides to the copula at every world-state. Thus, the semantic content of 'is green' is the property of being (an instance of the color) green, or being green, for short.
Next we apply this semantics to theoretical identification sentences. Let T P be a simple natural kind term -like 'green', 'water', or 'tiger' -and let P be the corresponding predicate -e.g. 'is green', 'is (an instance of) gold', 'is (an instance of)
water', or 'is a tiger'. Corresponding to T P , we take T Q be a term or phrase of the same type -a common noun or noun phrase -and we take Q be the corresponding predicate.
We then construct theoretical identification statements.
1a. For all x,y, x is hotter than y iff the mean molecular kinetic energy of x exceeds that of y. (One way of fleshing out Heat is mean molecular kinetic energy) d.
For all objects x, x is green iff x has surface spectral reflectance property SSR green -the property of reflecting substantially more light in the middle wavelength part of the visible spectrum than in the long wavelength part, and approximately the same amount of light in the short wavelength part as in the non-short part.
3a.
T P = T Q (if they exist) b.
Gold is the substance made up of the element with atomic number 79 (if it exists). c.
Water is the substance H 2 O (if it exists). d.
Green is the characteristic SSR green (if the color exists).
Since simple natural kind terms, and the predicates containing them, are Millian, these sentences express propositions with kinds as constituents -just as sentences containing simple proper names express singular propositions containing their referents. and 'green'. 'Water' was stipulated to designate whatever underlying physical characteristic it is that is shared by (nearly) all members of the class of paradigmatic water-samples that explains their most salient features -the fact that they boil and freeze at certain temperatures, that they are clear, potable, and necessary to life, etc. 'Green' was stipulated to be the characteristic of object surfaces causally responsible for the way that paradigmatic green-samples appear to us. It follows from these stipulations that if the terms have been successfully introduced, then the substance water and the color green just are the characteristics that causally explain the familiar properties of water and green-samples at the actual world-state. Thus, when it is discovered empirically that these characteristics are being (an instance of) H 2 O and being (an instance of) SSR green , we learn empirically that k w = the substance H 2 O and k g = the characteristic SSR green .
If the complex terms on the right-hand sides of these identity statements are rigid designators, it will follow the identities are necessary, and that instances of k w will be instances of H 2 O, and instances of k g will be instances of SSR green , at every possible world-state at which the kinds exist (in the sense of having instances at all). So, are these terms rigid? To ask this about 'the substance H 2 O' is to ask whether the substance H 2 O could have existed with being the substance H 2 O -i.e. without having as instances all and only those quantities that are made up of molecules having two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. Since the answer to this question seems clearly to be 'no', 'the substance H 2 O' is a rigid designator. Since we know empirically that it designates k w , we know that it is an essential property of k w that its instances are all and only quantities of H 2 O. Thus, water is, necessarily H 2 O. The same sort of account can be given for an object's being green at a world-state w iff it's surface has the characteristic SSR green at w.
Variations on this theme explain the necessity of all the truths in (1-3).
It is helpful, in understanding what is going on, to contrast the rigid term, 'the substance H 2 O' with the non-rigid term 'the substance that falls from the sky in rain, and fills the lakes and rivers'. Both designate k w . The reason we recognize the former, but not the latter, to be rigid, has to do with what we take substances to be -physically constitutive kinds, instances of which have the same underlying physical constitution.
Since being H 2 O is a itself such a kind, whereas falling from the sky as rain, and filling the lakes and rivers has nothing to do with physically constitutive structure, 'the substance H 2 O' designates the same substance at every world-state, whereas 'the substance that falls from the sky in rain, and fills the lakes and rivers' does not. A similar story can be told about the other cases.
In giving these explanations, I haven't said much about what natural kinds are. I have indicated that they exist and have instances at different possible world-states. The color green, though not itself a green object, has green objects as instances. Since different objects are green at different possible world-states, the color remains the same from state to state, even if its instances vary. The same is true of the substance water and the species tiger. 4 It is natural, in light of this, to take natural kinds to be abstract objects. What are we saying, when we say that these kinds are properties? Again, it is useful to proceed linguistically. The most basic fact about properties is that they are true of things that have them, just as predicates are true of things they apply to. As a first pass, then, it is natural to take properties to be the meanings, or semantic contents, of predicates. For example, the meaning of the predicate 'is water' is the property being made up of molecules consisting of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom -or, being H 2 O for short. 5 But now there is a problem. If, in addition to being the meaning of 'is water', being H 2 O is also the meaning of 'is H 2 O', then the two predicates mean the same thing. From this, R1-R3 would seem to follow.
R1
The proposition expressed by 'the stuff in the bath tub is water' is the same as that expressed by 'the stuff in the bath tub is H 2 O',
R2
Anyone who believes that the stuff in the bath tub is water thereby believes that the stuff in the bath tub is H 2 O, and
R3
The proposition that all and only water is H 2 O is knowable apriori, since it is just the proposition that all and only H 2 O is H 2 O.
But these results seem wrong.
Does this mean that natural kinds like water aren't properties? A parallel problem about propositions suggests that we should be cautious about drawing this conclusion. In addition to being designated by that-clauses, propositions can also be named. For example, the proposition that mathematics is reducible to logic may be named 'Logicism'. If, as I believe, Millianism is correct, then this proposition is the meaning, or semantic content, both of the name and of the clause 'that mathematics is reducible to logic'. But then, the same assumptions that led to R1-R3 will lead to R4-R6.
R4
The proposition expressed by 'Russell affirmed Logicism' is the same as the proposition expressed by 'Russell affirmed that mathematics is reducible to logic'.
R5
Anyone who believes that Russell affirmed Logicism thereby believes that Russell affirmed that mathematics is reducible to logic.
R6
The proposition that Logicism = the proposition that mathematics is reducible to logic is knowable apriori, since it is just the proposition that Logicism = Logicism.
Like the earlier results about kinds, these results about propositions seem wrong.
Consider, for example, a student attending his first lecture in the philosophy of mathematics. He is told that Logicism is a proposition about the relationship between logic and mathematics, that Formalism is a doctrine about the interpretation of mathematics, and so on. At this stage, he is unable to distinguish Logicism from other propositions about the relationship between logic and mathematics, or to describe it in any informative way. Nevertheless, he may acquire beliefs about Logicism. He may be told, "Russell affirmed Logicism," and thereby come to believe that Russell affirmed Logicism. 6 Since it doesn't seem that he thereby comes to believe that Russell affirmed that mathematics is reducible to logic, there appears to be something wrong with the reasoning leading to R4-R6.
Mark Richard has a diagnosis of what it is. 7 It's not that 'Logicism' and 'that mathematics is reducible to logic' don't have the same proposition as semantic content.
They do. However, the that-clause, being syntactically complex, can be understood only by understanding its grammatically significant constituents. To Richard, this suggests that the that-clause contributes not only its own content to the proposition expressed by sentences containing it, but also the contents of its constituents. Since the name 'Logicism' is syntactically simple, it has no such constituents, and thus contributes only its content to propositions expressed by sentences containing it. Of course, the proposition which is the semantic content of both the name and the clause itself has constituents. However, when one's epistemic contact with that proposition is mediated by one's competence with the name 'Logicism', one can be aware of the proposition, without being acquainted with, or able to articulate, its constituents. By contrast, when one's epistemic contact with the proposition is mediated by one's understanding of the corresponding that-clause, one is acquainted with, and can articulate, the constituents of the proposition -which are just the contents of the grammatically significant constituents of the clause. For Richard, this means that a complex content can occur in a larger proposition in two different ways -one way in which the contents that make it up are themselves constituents of the larger proposition, and one way in which they aren't.
For our purposes, it doesn't matter which of various ways to formally mark this distinction we choose, so long as the distinction is marked. When it is, we can distinguish propositions expressed by sentences containing the name 'Logicism' from those expressed by sentences in which the clause 'that mathematics is reducible to logic' is substituted for it. In this way, we block the problematic R4 --without giving up the idea that the name and the that-clause are both Millian terms for the same thing. We also block R5. To believe that Russell affirmed Logicism is to believe of the proposition that
Russell affirmed it -without necessarily knowing how to express that proposition, or articulate its constituents. To believe that Russell affirmed that mathematics is reducible to logic is to believe the same thing of the same proposition, while appreciating how it is articulated and broken down into parts. 8 We therefore get the plausible result R7.
R7
One can know/believe that Russell affirmed Logicism without knowing/ believing that he affirmed that mathematics is reducible to logic, but one cannot know/believe the latter without thereby knowing/believing the former.
Thus, we have a plausible solution to the problem about propositions --which can also be applied to our earlier problem about properties. clause, so we can block the unwanted conclusions R1 and R2 (about properties), while identifying the semantic content of the simple predicate 'is water' with that of the syntactically complex predicate 'is made up of molecules containing two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom' --or 'is H 2 O' for short. As before, we distinguish two ways in which the complex content can occur in a proposition -one way, contributed by 'is H 2 O', in which the contents that make up the complex are themselves constituents of the proposition, and one way, contributed by 'is water', in which they aren't. In this way, we distinguish propositions expressed by sentences containing 'is water' from those expressed by sentences in which 'is H 2 O' is substituted for it --thereby blocking R1. We also block R2. To believe that the stuff in the tub is water is, on this account, to believe of the property of being H 2 O that the stuff in the tub is an instance of it -without necessarily knowing how to informatively characterize the property, or articulate its constituents. To believe that the stuff in the tub is H 2 O is to believe the same thing of the same property, while appreciating how the property is articulated and being acquainted with its parts. This leads directly to R8, which parallels R7.
R8
One can know/believe that the stuff in the bath tub is water without knowing/ believing that the stuff in the bath tub is H 2 O, but one cannot know/believe the latter without thereby knowing/believing the former. The account also predicts that one can know apriori that water is H 2 O, which the conventional wisdom rightly denies.
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These difficulties suggest that the relationship between the simple predicate 'is water' and the grammatically complex predicate 'is H 2 O' is n o t analogous to the relationship between the name 'Logicism' and the clause 'that mathematics is reducible to logic'. 12 Whereas Logicism is the proposition that mathematics is reducible to logic,
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Remember that 'H 2 O' is not here used as a name. Rather, it is short for 'the substance instances of which are made up of molecules consisting of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom.' When R8 is understood in this way, it is intuitively obvious that its second half is false. This may lead one to wonder why the second half of R7 isn't also false. There is a reason for this -though as long as R8 is rejected, it doesn't matter for my argument about kinds what we say about R7. Why then, do I find the second half of R7 plausible? It's plausible because it is clear that believing that Russell affirmed that mathematics is reducible to logic involves being en rapport with the proposition p named by the 'that'-clause, and believing the bare singular proposition that Russell affirmed p. Since 'Russell affirmed Logicism' expresses the very same bare singular proposition about p, it follows that one who believes that Russell affirmed that mathematics is reducible to logic believes that Russell affirmed Logicism. By contrast, since the description 'H 2 O' rigidly designates the kind water, but it does not name it, H 2 O is F and Water is F express different propositions. Moreover, believing the descriptive proposition expressed by the former does not require being en rapport with the kind k designated by 'H 2 O', and believing the bare singular proposition about k expressed by Water is F (any more than believing the 2 10 is less than 1000 involves being en rapport with the number 1024 rigidly designated by '2 10 ', and believing the bare singular proposition that it is less than 1000'). Hence one can believe that H 2 O is so and so without believing that water is so and so. 11 The conventional wisdom is right to deny this, just as it is right to deny that it is knowable apriori that the first person to publish an axiomatic formalization of quantified modal logic is Ruth Marcus. Whether or not it is wrong to deny that it is knowable apriori that Ruth Barcan is Ruth Marcus -or, more properly, to deny that the proposition semantically expressed by the italicized sentence is knowable apriori --is another matter. For discussion, see chapters 3 and 8 of my Beyond Rigidity (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2002; also "Naming and Asserting," in Szabo, ed., Semantics versus. Pragmatics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 2005. Though the examples there involve singular rather than general terms, the points carry over. Some explicit discussion of examples involving general terms can be found in chapters 10 and 11 of Beyond Rigidity.
which is the meaning of both the name and the clause, the property being H 2 O can't be the meaning of both 'is water' and 'is H 2 O'. Either being water isn't being H 2 O, or one of the two predicates fails to have the associated property as its meaning.
Perhaps, then, the property being water isn't the property being H 2 O. If it isn't, then the identity statement (6a) in which the general terms 'water' and 'H 2 O' flank the identity sign will, of course, be false. However, (6b), understood as having the logical form (6c) or (6d), will still be true.
Water is H 2 O. c.
∀x [x is (an instance of) water ⊃ x is (an instance of)
Since many theoretical identification statements standardly taken to be instances of the Kripkean necessary aposteriori have logical forms along the lines of (6c,d), understanding (6b) in this way presents no special problem. So understood, the proposition expressed by (6b) will be necessary, provided that the properties being water and being H 2 O are necessarily equivalent. This proposition will be knowable only aposteriori provided two natural conditions are met -first, that we can acquire knowledge of the property being water by being acquainted with its instances and learning their molecular structure, and second, that having de re knowledge either of the property being water, or of the property being H 2 O, (that instances of it are so and so) doesn't guarantee that that one has corresponding knowledge of the other property (that its instances are also so and so). And indeed why should it? If properties, like propositions, are hyperintensional, then knowledge of a property P, that it is so and so, should no more guarantee knowledge of a necessarily equivalent property Q, that it is so and so, than knowledge of the truth of one proposition guarantees knowledge of the truth every proposition necessarily equivalent to it.
Put this way, the view seems attractive. However, it can't be correct --if the sketch I have given of natural kind terms is. Recall the idealized stipulation by which I imagined the term 'water' being introduced. 'Water' (I said) was to designate the physically constitutive characteristic shared by (nearly) all members of the class of its paradigmatic samples that explains their most salient features. Since we have learned that these features of water-samples are explained by their having the molecular structure H 2 O, being water must be the property being H 2 O, which, in turn, must be the meaning of the predicate 'is water' (but not of the predicate 'is H 2 O'). Note also that the stipulation introducing 'water' implicitly presupposes that there is only one property that explains the salient features of water-samples -since otherwise the stipulation would fail to determine a unique semantic value. So, if the stipulation was successful, no property other than being H 2 O explains those features. This suggests that properties -in the sense in which we talk about them in connection with scientific explanation involving natural kinds --are not hyperintensional.
This can be seen more easily by looking at a different case. Consider the natural kind term 'green', introduced by the stipulation that it is to designate the property of object surfaces causally responsible for the appearance of paradigmatic green-samples.
Physicalists about color tell us that this property is a certain surface spectral reflectance property that specifies proportions of light reflected at different wavelengths. 13 Let Q be a complex phrase of English explicitly mentioning those proportions. The color green is then the property being Q, even though the predicate 'is green' is clearly not synonymous with the predicate is Q. Suppose there is a different complex predicate is Q* that specifies the minute physical structure of object surfaces, such that is Q* turns out to be necessarily equivalent to is Q. Since, under this assumption, being Q* will explain the appearance of paradigmatic green-samples just as well as being Q does, the conception of properties presupposed by the stipulative introduction of 'green' requires being Q, being Q*, and being green to be one and the same property, even though the corresponding predicates clearly differ in meaning.
What then, are these properties, and how are they related to the meanings of complex predicates? The argument to this point suggests that natural kinds of the sort we have been discussing are coarse-grained properties that are individuated by their possible instances. If natural kind properties a and b have precisely the same instances in all (metaphysically) possible world-states, then a is identical with b. Intuitively this seems plausible. It is hard to imagine two distinct species of animal, two distinct substances, or two distinct colors which have precisely the same instances in every possible world-state.
On this picture, being H 2 O --which is identical with the property being water --has the same individuation conditions as the intension of 'is H 2 O' and 'is water'. Since 'water' is Millian, it has this coarse-grained property as both its meaning and referent, which is the key constituent of the meaning of the predicate 'is water'. By contrast, the meaning of the determined by the fine-grained structural property that is its meaning. Since the coursegrained property is also associated with 'water', each of the statements in (6) is necessary.
The characterization of these truths as aposteriori depends on two assumptionsone extremely plausible, and the other at least defensible. The plausible assumption, which has already been mentioned, is that we can acquire knowledge of the property being water by being acquainted with its instances and learning their molecular structure.
This ensures that we can come to know that water is H 2 O empirically. To seal the deal, we must rule out that the possibility that the same proposition can also be known apriori.
There is no problem distinguishing the proposition that water is H 2 O (which contains both the coarse-grained property being water and the fine-grained structural property involving hydrogen and oxygen) from the proposition that water is water, or the account given so far dictates a position on this epistemic assumption. However, the treatment of natural kinds as non-hyperintensional properties -on a par with objects both as constituents of reality and as things we become acquainted with through our causal interaction with the world -makes the assumption a natural one. Since it is also needed to conform to the conventional wisdom about the aposteriority of that water is H 2 O, it is, I think, reasonable to accept it.
The end result is an account according to which natural kinds are coarse-grained properties, individuated by their possible instances. These properties are both the meanings and referents of simple natural kind terms, as well as being crucial components of the semantic contents of simple natural kind predicates constructed from them. Like individuals, the coarse-grained properties that are the kinds may themselves have properties that are essential to them, even though knowing that they have these properties often requires empirical investigation. Unlike simple natural kind terms, grammatically complex natural kind phrases are not Millian. Although they designate coarse-grained natural kind properties, their meanings are fine-grained, structurally complex properties.
Hence they are not synonymous with simple natural kind terms, and the complex predicates constructed from them are not synonymous with the predicates built from simple natural kind terms. Understood in this way, instances of the necessary aposteriori involving natural kind terms parallel those involving Millian singular terms.
14 In order to appreciate this, it is important not to become confused about the use of the term 'property'. Sometimes in philosophy it is used linguistically, for meanings of predicates whether simple or complex, and sometimes it is used ontologically, as it is in connection with natural kinds and scientific explanation. Although both uses are account of all statements of property identity -called 'analyses' -whether they be philosophical or scientific analyses. Central to his position is the doctrine that the semantic contents grammatically simple predicates (of all sorts) are properties (whether simple or complex), while the semantic contents of grammatically complex predicates are never properties, but instead are combinations of the semantic contents of their constituents. Applied to the case of water/H 2 O, this means that the property being H 2 O is the meaning of 'is water', but not the meaning of 'is H 2 O'. In this respect, our views are alike. However, we differ on several significant details, including the following: (i) Whereas I take natural kind properties, like being H 2 O to be intensional, rather than hyper-intensional, King apparently takes them to be hyperintensional --since he takes them to be complex entities individuated, in part, by their constituent properties (e.g. the property being hydrogen and being oxygen).
(ii) His reason for denying that the semantic contents of complex predicates are properties (of any sort) is (therefore) different from mine. For him, the meaning of a complex predicate P is a structured complex, the constituents of which are the objects and properties designated by its simple subconstituents --related by a highly complex relation that is parasitic on the abstract linguistic structure of P. Since this relation encodes every aspect of the grammatical structure of the predicate, no matter how trivial, he assigns different meanings even to trivially differing predicates --like 'is an unmarried man' and 'is a man who's not married'. By contrast, he wouldn't deny that the property being an unmarried is the property being a man who's not married. Thus, he rejects the claim that properties are meanings of complex predicates. (iii) King's metaphysical account of what meaning is provides him with a further reason for rejecting this claim. On his account, the meanings of grammatically complex expressions are ontologically dependent on the existence of expressions used by agents (whether of a public language or a "language of thought"). This means that if properties were the meanings of complex predicates, then they couldn't exist, or have existed, without speakers. Since he, quite naturally, doesn't want to say this about properties, he concludes that properties are never the meanings of complex predicates. (He does think that these meanings uniquely determine properties, which they are said to represent -but he doesn't go into detail about what this relation consists in.) For my part, in addition to finding the ultra-fine-grained view of the meanings of complex predicates in (ii) questionable, I reject the metaphysics of meaning in (iii). If it were true, prior to the use of expressions by agents there could be no propositions and hence no propositional attitudes -beliefs, intentions, etc. However, the existence of these attitudes is surely required in order for their subsequent "thought," or use of language, to endow anything with meaning. A final point of contention concerns the informativeness of "the analysis" of 'Water is H 2 O'. For King this informativeness is to be explained by different competence conditions for the terms 'water' and 'H 2 O' -plus the uncontested fact that the proposition expressed by the sentence is different from that expressed by 'H 2 O is H 2 O'. The key point for King is that competence with 'water' does not require one to know of the complex property associated with the word that it is the property being made up of molecules with two hydrogen and one oxygen atom. property to be true of something, either essentially or accidentally. We must simply be careful about their identity conditions.
I close with an observation about the notion natural in discussing natural kinds, and natural kind terms. Roughly put, I take natural kinds to be the things designated by natural kind terms, and natural kind terms to be those it would make sense to introduce by reference-fixing stipulations like the ones for 'green', 'water', and 'tiger'. When does it make sense to introduce general terms in this way? Only, I think, when three prerequisites are satisfied.
P1.
The objects to which we wish to apply the term are similar in some respects, which guides our application of it, and allows us, fallibly but reliably, to apply it to new cases.
P2.
These similarities have, and are believed by us to have, a single unifying explanation, which, although we typically don't know it, we rightly believe to involve counterfactual-supporting generalizations relating unspecified features of (nearly) all the similar-appearing objects to the respects in which they are similar.
P3.
We wish to use the term in law-like generalizations and explanations -and so don't want to identify its semantic content with the cluster of observed similarities.
Satisfaction of P1 is what allows us to consistently and competently use the term prior to discovering the unknown explanatory property that its use is intended to track. 
